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How do poor people adapt to weather variability and natural 
disasters today? 
 
Poor people in much of the world are constantly threatened by the variability 
of the weather that they experience from year to year. Even without the 
effects of climate change, weather variability threatens the livelihoods of poor 
people.  Poor people have become very good at adapting to the vicissitudes of 
their weather, and the capacities that they have developed to cope with 
current variability are indicative of those that will be needed to adapt to the 
effects of climate change. Unfortunately, poor people are already close to the 
limits of their capacities to cope, and the added effects of climate change may 
push them beyond their coping capacities unless real efforts are made to 














Figure 1 shows the variability in rainfall across the Western Sahel from 1949 to 
1990. The data are averages of measurements taken at 38 weather stations and 
are expressed as standard deviations around the long-term mean. There was a 
long-term decrease in mean rainfall between 1950 and 1970, but what is more 
important is the year-to-year variability in rainfall that has occurred 
throughout the period.  Even during the years of worst drought, between 1970 
and 1985, there were years when the rainfall was close to or above average. 
During the “good” years of the 1950s rainfall varied drastically from year to 
year.  This variation is an indication of the situation that is expected to be 
exacerbated by climate change: an increase in catastrophic events – in this 
case periodic drought years. The effects in the Sahel of this drying associated 
with year-to-year variability have been serious. During the wetter periods, the 
occurrence of dry years made it very difficult for farmers to predict what 
would happen to different kinds of crops.  Root crops that would grow in a   2
good year and provide a valuable addition to the diet would fail in dry years. 
Maize began to be grown increasingly in areas that had traditionally been used 
for the more drought-tolerant sorghum or millet, but maize now fails 
frequently during dryer years.  By the 1970s crop options became reduced in 
much of the rainfed Sahel to the truly drought-tolerant crops, but even they 
did poorly in the worst years. Farmers found it more and more difficult to 
survive poor years without selling assets, which reduced the ability of farmers 
to recover in subsequent years. The 1970s saw severe food shortages and 
considerable numbers of people moving permanently from their homes. 
 
However, despite these pressures, the 1980s and 19990s were marked by a 
remarkable turn-around in the economy of the Sahel, with Mali at one point 
becoming Africa’s main producer of cotton. The people of the Sahel are clearly 
extremely good at managing very difficult conditions. 
 
Mobile Pastoralism 
All around the dryer parts of the developing world, herders move their flocks 
over vast distances every year. Mobile pastoralism is an ancient and effective 
and efficient way of deriving benefit from the arid and semi-arid parts of the 
world. Where water is lacking and droughts frequent, livestock always feature 
in farming systems. By being mobile, herders can make the best use of scarce 
rainfall. Mobility allows herders to use centuries of accumulated knowledge to 
drive their animals to where they know the best pasture will be at any time. It 
also allows flexibility to search for good pasture in poor years. While often 
regarded as a primitive and backward way of life, mobile pastoralism is 
actually a very efficient way of using scarce resources, and while appearing 
anarchic and uncontrolled, is actually managed through complex and proven 
societal norms that determine when resources can be used, by whom and by 
how much. In this way ecosystems are managed sustainably while maximizing 
the benefits to the pastoral communities. 
 
If pastoralism is to play a major role in adapting to climate change in the 
future, it will be extremely important not to repeat policy mistakes of the 
past. When governments and development agencies began to turn their 
attention to pastoral communities in the 1970s, their lack of understanding of 
the efficiencies of mobility led to a number of serious mistakes being made. It 
was assumed that the ranching models of the USA and other places would be 
more efficient than the “primitive nomadic” systems found around the 
developing world. Governments (often backed by laws that declared the 
government to be the sole owner of land) began to control the movement of 
pastoralists and encourage them to settle down in one place. This was resisted 
by most pastoralists, who saw their herds being kept away from perfectly good 
sources of grass and water that they had used for centuries. The “scientific” 
application of ranching usually simply did not work. Scientists from a ranching 
background applied “linear” models that calculated the carrying capacity of an 
area of rangeland. Mobile pastoral systems are inherently non-linear, with   3
complex and important interactions involving animals, people, landscapes, 
numerous possible movements and knowledge. Shifting from an essentially 
sustainable non-linear model to a simplified linear model in difficult dry 
conditions proved disastrous, and projects failed as animals died and the 
environment was ruined.  These failures were exacerbated by other errors such 
as introducing improved breeds of animals that could not withstand the harsh 
conditions of a mobile life. Even now, pastoralists get little help. They are 
impeded by national barriers, they remain ignored in national planning and 
their land rights are not recognized and their ancestral rangelands are 
increasingly being turned over to farming. If pastoralists are to contribute to 
adaptation to a world affected by climate change there will need to be much 
better understanding of the potential and limitations of pastoralism and a 
much better policy response. 
 
  Box 1 
Pastoralists adapt to changing conditions and new pressures 
 
Pastoralists around the world are proving their ability to adapt to changing conditions. 
Governments often place huge pressures on the pastoralists to “modernize”, in the mistaken 
belief that the pastoral lifestyle is not viable. In fact, pastoralism is viable, and good policy can 
help to optimize livelihoods. The challenge under conditions of climate change will be to learn 
that pastoralists are good at adapting, and their main need is for policies that help them and not 
policies that try to change them. 
 
Land tenure can be particularly vexing for pastoralists. They depend upon mobility as a prime 
adaptive strategy, but governments constantly try to settle them. Colonial and post-colonial 
governments have usually regarded mobile pastoralism as primitive, and settled life on a plot of 
land with individual title as modern. In the highlands of Bolivia, for example, the government 
put great pressure on communal pastoral communities to follow Bolivia’s land reform process of 
the 1950s and sub-divide the land into individually-owned plots. The pastoralists knew that this 
would threaten their efficient customary practices where entry to the land, herd sizes and 
seasonal use are all controlled.  However, during the 1970s the pastoralists finally conceded and 
their land was divided into plots around small villages, and people were given title to the land. 
Fortunately, the community at large did not change their ways, and continue to manage the land 
according to traditional ways. A very similar situation has evolved in Kenya, where the Maasai 
conceded to a system of group ranches where individuals own individual plots.  However, 
ecology triumphed over tenure, and the Maasai generally still manage their land communally, 
which holds great promise for setting communal land aside for earning income from wildlife 
tourism. However, the existence of individual title is placing great pressures on the system, for 
example where owners have leased out their land to wheat farmers who quickly destroyed it or 
near to Nairobi where roadside plots can be sold at a high price. 
 
Pastoralists are often poorly provided with social service, if they receive any service at all. Few 
pastoral children receive adequate education, even though education will be vital if pastoral 
communities are to be able to demand rights and adapt to the changing world. Iran and Mongolia 
have both demonstrated that it is possible for governments to provide good quality social 
services to mobile communities. Both countries have provided mobile schools that follow 
communities around. In Mongolia this has resulted in remarkably high literacy rates [Insert from 
HDR]. In Iran, communities have been provided with tented primary schools – white tents to 
distinguish them from the normal black of the community. Most schooling takes place during the 
seasons when the communities do not move much. In the spring, when the community’s tents 
are packed and the community moves, the school tents follow them. The teachers are drawn 
from pastoral communities, so they are very aware of the special needs of their communities.   4
 
Box 2 
Hope in the face of disaster – the case of Baringo 
 
Lake Baringo is one of Africa’s large Rift Valley lakes. Never particularly deep, it is now suffering 
from siltation caused by severe run-off from the basin surrounding it. Scientists give it little 
more that 20 years before it fills up and becomes a swamp. The fishing industry has collapsed, 
the fish factory has closed, and the formerly benign population of fish-eating crocodiles has 
begun to prey on goats and have become a danger to people. The cause of this ecological and 
human disaster is severe over-grazing in the basin exacerbated by a reduction in river flow from 
the highlands. The hills surrounding the basin and the flatlands around the lake have mostly 
been grazed to a red dust where extensive herds of goats browse on the few surviving Acacia 
bushes. Local people report that the rains are now more erratic that previously and last for a 
much shorter time each year. The main cause of the overgrazing is that the various groups of 
people around the lake have been forced to abandon their former mobile ways of life and 
become sedentary. Some of the reasons can be traced back to misguided colonial experiments in 
ranching and now to conflict among the tribes of the region. Food aid policies that rewarded 
sedentarism and lack of productivity have also played their part.  The now non-mobile animal 
owners still manage the land communally, but now cannot take their herds to where grass and 
water are available, nor control the pressure on the land. The future of Baringo has never looked 
bleaker. 
 
Fortunately, the fate of the people of Baringo is turning. For the last twenty years communities 
have been working with a local non governmental organization – the Rehabilitation of Arid 
Environments (RAE) Trust – to restore the land and improve their livelihoods. The social and 
physical history of Baringo is preventing people from returning to their former efficient use of 
the environment, and the costs of losing mobility have been huge. The communities have now 
agreed that the only way to protect the land will be to reduce grazing, and to do this people will 
have to learn to manage fenced enclosures instead of manage the land communally. The 
communities have decided to fence off plots of 10 acres or more to be managed by families, 
shareholders and women’s groups. The RAE Trust, building on many years of research, is able to 
recommend the best grass species for restoration and prepare the land for seeding. With grazing 
animals excluded, the barren soils of Baringo produce healthy grass cover in 2 – 3 years. People 
can then use that grass as a basis for money-making enterprises. Some keep a few high value 
animals. Others charge fees for fattening animals bound for market. All sell the grass seed to 
others interested in land rehabilitation and the grass itself is used for thatching or sold as hay. 
Once the grass is growing it holds rainwater well, and trees naturally return to the landscape. 
These attract birds and insects, can be cut and sold as firewood and allow a honey industry to be 
set up. 
 
UNDP’s Drylands Development Centre, the RAE Trust and the World Agroforestry Centre are now 
investigating how much additional carbon is sequestered when bare soil is replace by grass and 
trees. Farmers, like those in Baringo, have the potential to contribute to the mitigation of 
atmospheric carbon levels by adopting land management practices that sequester carbon. At 
present, bio-sequestration of this kind is not covered by the Kyoto Protocol. Improved carbon 
trading norms are needed to allow poor farmers to become part of a truly global carbon trading 
regime.  The people of Baringo have demonstrated a remarkable ability to adapt to deteriorating 
conditions, developing new technologies that, with the right support, can be extended to other 
communities.    5
Agriculture in dry areas 
 
Examples of farming systems in dryland Africa, Middle East, and Asia 
 
Sub-Saharan Africa 
The Sahel forms the northernmost edge of cropped land in sub-Saharan Africa, 
stretching in a latitudinal band along the southern edge of the Sahara Desert. 
Low and unreliable rainfall (approximately 200-800 mm per annum) is a major 
constraint for agricultural production, although other factors also play a major 
role, especially low soil fertility (Sanders 1989) and the poverty of rural 
inhabitants, which greatly limits their ability to take drought-protective 
measures. Off-farm migration of males for employment during dry seasons and 
droughts is a common coping mechanism, although it creates hardship for 
families left behind.  
 
In the driest, parts of the Sahel, extremely drought-tolerant millet/cowpea 
cropping systems predominate; moving southwards, rainfall increases and 
sorghum/groundnut systems increase in frequency. In southern Africa along the 
fringes of the Kalahari Desert, these same cropping systems are found although 
there is a stronger demand for maize in the diet. As a result, maize is often 
cropped in very dry areas in southern Africa despite its greater drought 
susceptibility, leading to frequent crop failures. In Ethiopia, teff is often grown 
in the drylands. 
 
Livestock are equally important as crops in most of dryland Africa. Nomadic 
herding is a traditional mechanism for reducing drought risk. Livestock are 
mobile, unlike crops so when drought strikes they can move to greener pastures 
and water sources. However, the nomadic lifestyle is under increasing pressure 
from the expansion of cropland as well as urban and state land uses (roads, 
industries, borders). These trends restrict herd movements, exposing them to 
greater drought risk and considerable suffering. 
 
Middle East-North Africa-West Asia 
Most land in the Middle East and North Africa is desert, and population 
densities are high on the narrow coastal strips of arable dryland. Most countries 
cannot produce enough food to feed their populations, and are net food 
importers.  Because of their long history of intensive cultivation, much of the 
land is degraded from erosion, or salinized as a result of irrigation (Winslow 
and Thomas 2006). 
 
Around the edges of the Mediterranean Sea, a marginal 200-350 mm of winter 
rainfall is sufficient to cultivate only drought-hardy cereal (barley, wheat), 
legume (chickpea, faba bean, forage legume) and tree (olives, fruits, nuts) 
crops, together with sheep and goat herding. Rangelands are degraded due to 
excessive livestock populations relative the low primary productivity of these   6
rainfed grasslands. Herders are increasingly required to purchase livestock feed 
and fodder to stay in operation. 
 
Nile River Valley agriculture is based on intensively-managed irrigation. The 
enormous population pressure and lack of rainfall in this zone makes it heavily 
dependent on intensive cultivation, which causes salinity buildup, water 
pollution and water shortages. Climate change could wreak major havoc if it 
affects the hydrology of the Nile basin. 
 
In the Arabian Peninsula, agriculture depends on groundwater but in many 
areas non-renewable aquifers are being depleted. In Iran and Pakistan, rugged 
mountainous terrain and extreme temperature variability, especially cold 
winters impact agriculture. Irrigation in steep terraces, ravines and mountain 
areas often scars the land with erosion gullies. Salinity is widespread in inter-




The central spine of the Indian sub-continent running from its southern 
midsection north to Pakistan’s Himalayas is a dryland zone that is home to 
about half a billion people. The delicate balance between the desert and 
people is breaking down due to increasing populations of humans and livestock, 
unchecked deforestation, over-grazing, over-cultivation and soil erosion. 
Growing populations lead to land subdivision through inheritance, leaving 
successive generations entrenched in poverty. 
 
Almost every year, India experiences drought somewhere. In dryland areas 
across India, water tables are falling due to over-pumping, prompting 
government investments to improve community watershed management and in 
large-scale irrigation systems. Millet, chickpea, sorghum, pigeonpea, cotton, 
groundnut, mustard, maize castor bean and soybean are important dryland 
crops, in order of increasing moisture requirement. 
 
Small-scale water management systems 
 
In the Sahel, water harvesting is often practiced using small bunds or dikes 
made of dirt, stone or living vegetation along slope contours. Terracing and 
trenching are used in some steeply sloped areas in Ethiopia. Burkina Faso, with 
World Bank assistance encouraged the construction of earthen and stone 
contour dikes across 60,000 hectares in the heavily-degraded Yatenga area 
during the 1970s/80s (Sanders et al. 1996). 
 
More than 100,000 laterite-encrusted hectares in the Central Plateau of 
Burkina Faso and in Niger have been recovered for agriculture by smallholders 
using the zaï technique, which involves the digging small circular pits in the soil 
surface and adding organic matter to both capture runoff water and stimulate   7
biological activity and tree regeneration. Small check dams are sometimes 
constructed to slow runoff and increase water infiltration into the soil. 
Recently in Niger, millions of hectares of ‘farmer-managed natural 
regeneration’ of native trees has been reported; although more trees consume 
more water, they also increase soil organic matter and infiltration, causing 
water tables to rise in some villages (Chris Reij, Univ. of Wageningen, 
unpublished data). 
 
In the drylands of Ethiopia and Sudan, smallholders have evolved indigenous 
techniques for water harvesting (Krüger et al. 1996; Niemeijer 1999). For World 
Bank reviews of different techniques utilized in Sub-Saharan Africa see Reij et 
al. 1988; and Critchley et al. 1994.) 
 
In hilly and mountainous areas of the Middle East, North Africa and West Asia, 
canyons, valleys and slopes are utilized by dryland peoples to capture water 
through ingenious but labor-intensive water harvesting techniques such as 
‘aflaj’, ‘qanats’ and ‘spate irrigation’. In India, major government backing has 
encouraged community watershed management to capture runoff water and 
increase local groundwater recharge, along with the adoption of modern 
agricultural technologies and the recycling of organic wastes to raise soil 
fertility.   
 
The future of drylands farming under scenarios of climate change: what will be 
needed to adapt? 
 
Climate change predictions are still too coarse to give highly specific guidance 
about rainfall levels, but several models suggest that hot, dry areas will get 
hotter and drier, along with increased weather variability and more extreme 
weather events (floods, droughts, winds). The Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change, Working Group II on Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability 
recently consolidated global scientific opinion to conclude that dryland areas, 
particularly along the desert margins of Africa face great risk. Drought-affected 
areas are likely to expand, and the poor have the least capacity to adapt to the 
increasing severity of weather events that are expected (IPCC 2007). 
 
To adapt to increasing weather variability, buffering and diversification 
strategies are needed, as described below. 
 
Cropping systems change 
If climates change, farmers will shift cropping patterns to adapt, as long as 
markets can be found for their produce (Tiffen 2002, 2003). If the drylands 
become wetter, increased maize, rice and wheat cultivation is likely; if they 
become drier, millet production may rise, although its market potential is 
limited by low human consumption rates. Livestock grazing may be the only 
remaining dryland use in areas that become too dry for crops, although 
impediments to nomadic herding discussed earlier will probably constrain its   8
resurgence. Marginalized farmers will most likely migrate to wetter areas as 
landless laborers or in search of low-wage urban employment, incurring 
considerable suffering for their families in the process. 
 
Water harvesting and small-scale irrigation 
Improved water management can sequester the excess expected from extreme 
rainfall events to be used later during the worsening droughts. Water 
harvesting can be increased through development assistance to promote 
community watershed management, build small check-dams, and similar 
interventions. While the Middle East and North Africa have almost fully 
exploited their scarce water resources, irrigation efficiency can be increased 
by modernizing systems (e.g. drip irrigation, needs-based supplemental 
irrigation) (World Bank 2007). There is more potential for the expansion of 
irrigation in the Sahel (Sonou 1994) if it can be made affordable for poverty-
stricken smallholders. High-value crops grown using affordable, water-saving 
technologies such as gravity-flow drip irrigation on small areas of land (e.g. 0.1 
hectare)  can substantially increase incomes (IPALAC, 2003). 
 
Integrated crop management 
Drought tolerance has been a major breeding objective worldwide for decades, 
but progress has been relatively modest. Genetic changes that reduce water 
use also reduce biomass production and yield, reducing economic 
competitiveness. More success has been achieved through increasing plant 
adaptation to dryland agro-ecological niches, such as adjusting phenology (time 
required to mature) to better fit prevailing rainfall patterns, and increasing 
disease resistance (diseases weaken plant drought hardiness and water use 
efficiency). 
 
Apart from solving basic adaptation and disease/pest resistance problems, 
breeding-only strategies for dryland cropping systems do not have a strong 
track record of success (e.g. Ahmed et al. 2000) because drought and low soil 
fertility constrain the expression of higher genetic yield potential. The 
correction of nutrient deficiencies (especially phosphorus, nitrogen and soil 
organic matter) and small-scale water harvesting provide synergistic effects in 
combination with improved varieties; these three improvements should be 
pursued in an integrated fashion to reduce drought losses and buffer against 
weather variability. 
 
Diversification with higher-value crops   
The addition of high-value crops to dryland farming systems can boost incomes 
while diversifying the farm enterprise to reduce risk. The integration of tree, 
crop and livestock systems increases biodiversity while raising productivity 
through greater re-cycling of nutrients. Trees mediate wind and water erosion, 
and often tap groundwater resources through deep roots.   9
 
Policies 
Emergency grain reserves can reduce food price spikes that create hunger 
following droughts. Minimum guaranteed prices can reduce farmers’ risk of 
price collapse during favorable years. Policies that connect smallholders to 
foreign markets and input supplies and protect against unfair foreign subsidies 
raise dryland incomes and reduce dependence on the local climate. Better 
educational services can increase off-farm employment opportunities, 
especially for the next generation that is likely to face even more serious 
weather variability. 
 
Longer-term development pathways 
Rainfed agriculture in the drylands is already a risky, marginal enterprise. Farm 
families’ main objective is to produce enough food to survive. Occasional 
production surpluses are viewed as fortuitous events when they occur, but not 
to be relied upon for survival. Droughts every 3-5 years demolish welfare gains 
achieved during the interim. 
 
Hundreds of millions of poor dryland inhabitants worldwide are highly exposed 
to the increasing vicissitudes of climate change. The poorest are dependent on 
rainfed subsistence agriculture and need urgent and continuing humanitarian 
assistance to ease their plight. But they also need development pathways that 
help them escape from this trap.  
 
Two opposite paths have been postulated. In the downward spiral hypothesis 
(Cleaver and Schreiber 1994) ever-increasing populations degrade fragile lands, 
compelling the poor to degrade those lands even further to scratch out a living. 
In the ‘induced innovation’ scenario (Boserup 1965), on the other hand, social 
organization and competitive pressures force innovation towards higher-value 
livelihoods. 
 
Both views can cite supporting evidence (Winslow et al. 2004). Surveys of the 
literature indicate that favorable outcomes through induced innovation tend to 
be associated with the realization of local comparative advantages; access to 
productivity-enhancing technologies that outpace increases in labor; and 
improved access to growing markets (Hazell and Haddad 2001; Mortimore 2005; 
Pender, 1998; Pender et al. 2001). 
 
As populations increase, urban centers tend to coalesce and generate 
meaningful non-farm employment. This transition is occurring more rapidly in 
Africa than many realize (Tiffen 2003) and provides an outlet for the transition 
of farm labor into the urban sector, if accompanied by education and 
supportive policies. 
 
Farmers need urban areas as customers, and urban areas will trade their cash 
for the food they cannot grow themselves. The two sectors are mutually   10
supportive. The increased income that can be earned from agricultural sales to 
growing urban markets motivates investments in more productive technologies 
such as small-scale supplementary irrigation, soil fertility improvement, 
terracing and other practices that buffer against weather fluctuations (Tiffen 
2002). 
 
The effect of connections to urban markets, then is to raise farm incomes, 
increase access to knowledge and technology, and to provide youth with 
opportunities to escape rural poverty through urban employment. The buying 
power of urban areas, in a sense thus helps insulate them from climate change. 
Policies that encourage this rural-to-urban transition can thus enhance 
resilience to climate change.  
 
Since urban areas have purchasing power and political influence, they can also 
source their foodstuffs internationally if local crops fail due to weather 
variability, although this should be done in ways that do not undermine local 
farmers. Higher prices resulting from drought-induced production shortfalls 
help compensate farmers for their drought losses. However an influx of 
subsidized imports can eliminate that compensatory buffer, and cause rural 
areas to sink further into poverty. 
 
Although some argue that subsidies and protections should be avoided, others 
point out that no dryland society in history has ever emerged from poverty 
without supportive government policies. Defensive measures seem justifiable 
as long as developed countries continue to strongly subsidize their exports to 
the developing world. 
 
Ultimately the most efficient global adjustment would be to foster the inherent 
advantages of different regions. The latest IPCC conclusions suggest that crop 
productivity may increase in large areas of the temperate latitudes, while 
being adversely affected in the tropics, especially in the drylands (IPCC 2007). 
 
However, comparative advantage analysis should include more than just 
biophysical factors; cultural, economic and other considerations must also be 
taken into account; and social goals such as equity and poverty alleviation are 
also important. The developing-world drylands hold certain advantages such as 
relatively low-cost land and labor, and unique local biodiversity. Many specialty 
crops and products adapted to warm, dry, sunny environments could deliver 
increased incomes to the poor, if local, regional and international markets 
were opened to them and fostered. 
   11
Box 3 
Science to the rescue – stress resistant crops 
 
In ancient time, before Europeans knew Africa, an important source of food on the continent 
was African rice (Oryza glaberrima). This tough, weed-like plant was quickly supplanted by the 
higher-yielding Asian rice (Oryza sativa) when it was introduced to Africa. However, Asian rice 
needs very specific conditions to thrive – plenty of water and careful weed control being most 
important. During the 1990s scientists at the African Rice Centre (WARDA), supported by the 
Government of Japan and UNDP, discovered ways of crossing the African and Asian species, 
creating a remarkable “New Rice for Africa”, or NERICA. NERICA combines the yield and quality 
of Asian rice with the toughness of African rice. NERICA smothers competing weeds, resists 
drought and other stresses and resists attack by insects. As a result of an accelerated breeding 
programme, NERICAs are already available throughout Africa and are becoming the preferred 
varieties for many farmers.  
 
Meanwhile, similar efforts are under way to make maize more resistant to drought and other 
stresses. Even today, outside of the temperate zones, 15% of potential maize yields are lost to 
drought. This amounts to 19 million tonnes of food each year. The International Maize and Wheat 
Improvement Centre (CIMMYT), and the International Institute of Tropical Agriculture (IITA), 
with funding from the Gates Foundation, have selected varieties of drought-resistant maize that 
are already planted on approaching one million hectares of land in Africa, leading to yield 
increases of 25 – 30%. 
 
The excellent progress already made to increase the resistance of crops to climate stress has 
demonstrated how important agricultural research will be in adapting to climate change. The 
scientists involved have mobilized their full armoury of skills. Some of the work has identified 
the many underlying physical and physiological traits that result in drought tolerance. 
Meanwhile, field scientists have recognized that farmers are the best qualified to identify the 
best varieties, and have carried out their research with the full participation of farming 
communities. This is an excellent example of building new adaptive approaches on the current 
knowledge of farmers of how to deal with today’s weather. Unfortunately, despite the obvious 
value of agricultural research, the amount of money spent worldwide on agricultural 
development has been falling since the 1980s. CIMMYT, IITA, WARDA and 13 other vital 
international research organizations receive about $500 million per year: an amount that is 
totally inadequate. Developing countries follow this example. Even where 60 – 80% of 
populations depend upon farming, countries typic a l l y  i n v e s t  2  –  4 %  o f  n a t i o n a l  b u d g e t  t o  
agriculture, within which the amount for research is miniscule. It is difficult to comprehend a 
world where so little is invested into the science that will of such great importance to future 
survival.   12
Responding to increasing food crises  
The more apocalyptic predictions of climate change anticipate a world where 
levels of hunger will increase catastrophically. This assumes that food 
production will decrease worldwide, that there will be areas of famine caused 
by crop failure and that world trade will not compensate for local crop failure. 
The sections above have indicated that considerable resilience can be built into 
livestock and crop production systems. However, it is probable that overall 
global food production systems will be affected by climate change, and it will 
be important to understand the strengths and weaknesses of current models 
used to ensure global food security and make sure that the right policies are 
adopted to cope with the threats of climate change and other changes. 
 
Food supply is becoming increasingly globalized in today’s world. Large 
producer subsidies in the OECD have driven down world prices and made huge 
amounts of basic foods available for trade on the world market. Whether this 
situation will continue into the future is a matter of some debate. Models used 
by FAO and the OECD predict cereal prices will remain more or les steady until 
2015. They expect falling rates of global population to keep demand down. 
Others, particularly in the NGO community point out that rising demands for 
meat and luxury foods in the growing markets of Asia will push prices up. If the 
O E C D  f o l l o w s  t h r o u g h  o n  p l a n s  t o  r e m o v e  p r o d u c e r  s u b s i d i e s ,  t h i s  w i l l  a l s o  
drive up world prices. Those who worry that today’s supply of cheap food will 
disappear in the future point out that recent world harvests have not met 
global demand, and that global cereal stocks are at their lowest since the early 
1970s when food production was considered to be in crisis. Figure 2 shows 
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The direct effects of climate change on food production are difficult to predict 
[cross reference wherever in the HDR this is discussed].  One unexpected effect 
might be if significant amount of land and resources are used to create bio-
fuels rather than food. Figure 3 shows the amount of maize exported from the   13
USA (red line) and the remarkable increase in maize used in the USA for bio-
fuel. This mirrors a rapid increase in the global production of ethanol for 















The international model applied to deal with natural disasters has been based 
for the last 30 years on an assumption that there will be a surplus of relatively 
cheap food in the world. The dominant model has been for the official and non-
governmental agencies involved to maximize their readiness to rush relief 
supplies to affected areas after a disaster has occurred. Little has been done to 
increase the resilience of people to risk, as evidenced by the continuing 
destruction caused by droughts and storms in areas regularly affected. In view 
of any risk that the supply of cheap food on the world market might be 
reduced, it will be important to develop other ways of dealing with crisies. 
Even without the full effects of climate change, the number of disasters has 
risen in recent decades, growing from fewer than 100 global events in 1975 to 
426 in 2006 (World Bank 2006; CRED 2007).  At the same time, the scale of 
many disasters has grown, such that the number of people affected increased 
from 1.6 billion in the period 1984 to 1993, to almost 2.6 billion during 1994 to 
2004 (Guha-Sapir et. al. 2004).  In the most recent, relatively “quiet” year 
roughly 143 million people had their lives and livelihoods disrupted by 
exogenous shocks of various kinds (CRED 2007).   
 
The economic costs (damage to assets, income foregone, and the cost of relief) 
have also escalated.  It is estimated that the economic impact of disasters is today 
15 times higher than in the 1950s (in constant dollars)—equivalent to $652 billion 
in material losses in the 1990s, compared with $38 billion (at 1998 values) 
between 1950 and 1959 (Freeman et. al. 2003). Economic losses in 2006 were 
estimated at more than US$ 34 billion (CRED 2007).     14
 
Humanitarian appeals through the United Nations’ consolidated appeals process 
have grown in response to these challenges, rising from $1.5 billion in 1997 to 
$3.9 billion in 2007.  Adding expenditure by non-governmental agencies and 
contributions of the general public and private sector, it has been estimated 
that total resources flowing to humanitarian responses have recently averaged 
around $5 billion per year of late--a level that continues to grow.   However, 
most costs are borne by the country itself since external aid typically offsets 
less than 10% of a country’s disaster losses (Linnerooth-Bayer and Amendola 
2000).  Although shocks can occur almost anywhere on the globe, losses in 
developing countries are generally higher than in industrialized countries as a 
share of gross national income or government revenue—mainly due of lack of 
disaster-proofing, lack of insurance systems, poor standards for urban 
development, large concentrations of poor people in urban slums, a lack of 
early warning, and an absence of functioning safety nets.  For example, the 
Maldives’ tsunami losses amounted to 66% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), 
while Hurricane Mitch caused losses equal to 41% of GDP in Honduras (World 
Bank 2006).  Similarly, while in 2006 the United States faced large absolute 
losses to disasters (an estimated US$5 billion), it was Guyana that suffered the 
largest losses relative to overall income—a devastating 21.5% of GDP (CRED 
2007).  
 
In cases like Guyana, losses are linked to the devastation of rural economies, 
including loss of assets (livestock perishing in droughts or irrigation 
infrastructure swept away by a tsunami), loss of revenue (such as when floods 
causing salinisation of paddy fields, or destroy stocks of seeds and fertilizer, 
which impairs post-crisis agricultural output), and/or loss of markets (where 
export production or processing are compromised).   
 
There is a strong inverse relationship between the occurrences of shocks (be it a 
natural disaster or an armed conflict) and progress in tackling undernourishment or 
reducing poverty in poor countries (Webb and Rogers 2003).  Droughts, floods, 
conflicts, and political or economic instability compound the daily risks facing food 
insecure communities.  While investing in agricultural productivity is important to 
achieving longer-term development in many locations, the very sustainability of 
progress in agriculture is threatened where developmental gains do not reduce 
people’s vulnerability to shocks.  Hence, as Sparrow (2001) puts it, “catastrophe is 
no longer a brief dip on the curve of development but a danger to the process 
itself.”   
 
There are four main types of disaster: a) sudden natural shocks, such as Hurricane 
Mitch or the Orissa Super-Cyclone, require urgent action to save lives, which 
implies a need for rapid delivery of bulk commodities, especially where 
infrastructure has been destroyed.  Pest (locusts) and disease outbreaks (avian flu) 
that impact human livelihoods can also be classified as sudden onset.  Chronic 
emergencies (b) are characterized by pockets of people who normally survive long   15
periods of chronic food insecurity, but whose needs become acute when shocks 
destabilize their (already eroded) capacity to cope. Complex emergencies (c) 
remain a dangerous challenge, being associated with armed conflict in the context 
of failed or failing states, such as recent crises in Afghanistan, Somalia and 
Lebanon.  Finally, slow-onset emergencies (d) are typically linked to droughts or 
certain types of recurrent flooding.  While these can be anticipated, the impact is 
not always predictable--the scale of the 2002/03 crisis in southern and eastern 
Africa being a case in point.  In areas lacking resources and services, creeping 
disasters manifest more slowly and their determinants are less clear, which makes 
defining the appropriate response a challenge.  In 2006, floods accounted for 55% 
of all forms of natural disaster occurrences (CRED 2007).  
 
These kinds of shocks are not all random occurrences, but tend to concentrate in 
certain locations that become inherently risky to human activity—seismic zones, 
drought prone (ecologically semi-arid) regions, coastal and riverine locations 
subject to frequent flooding or windstorms, and steep (often eroded) hillsides.   
The huge numbers of individuals killed or affected by disasters tend to inhabit 
such difficult environments (some of which face more than one kinds of shocks).  
Public and private investments tend to avoid these locations, but poor and 
vulnerable communities cannot.  Without investment, productivity levels remain 
low (hence chronic poverty and malnutrition in these places), and the need for 
systems of disaster insurance or protection (safety nets) rises—a need that is rarely 
adequately met in already poor developing countries.  As a result, beneficiaries of 
disaster relief tend to be inhabitants of marginalized agricultural systems, 
receiving limited public protection from shocks, who are thus caught in a vicious 
cycle of seeking to minimize risks, but never being able to optimize outputs.   
 
It has been estimated that around 40% of the world’s productive lands lie in arid, 
semi-arid and dry sub-humid zones, with almost 1 billion people relying for their 
livelihoods on the natural resources found in these locations (HTF 2005).  Another 
11% of the world’s population live in mountainous areas, of whom 40% are food 
insecure.  In other words, roughly 50% of the world’s chronically undernourished 
people are small farmers inhabiting ‘marginal’ lands.  The implications are huge.  
First, without serious and sustained investment in such environments many 
countries will not come close to attaining internationally-agreed goals for poverty 
and hunger reduction.  Investments are needed both for enhancing productivity 
(through soil fertility enhancement, improved water management, pest and 
disease control, and reduced marketing costs), and for better managing risks (with 
drought-resistant crops, diversified crop and livelihood portfolios, crop insurance, 
etc).  At the same time, the human vulnerability of such large numbers of people 
has to be minimized through effective safety nets and human capital enhancement 
(Freeman et al 2003).  This requires improved and extended national and local 
early warning systems, strengthened national capacity to respond to emergencies, 
and more predictable funding of such preparedness at international levels, and 
effective (well financed and managed) productive safety nets based on availability   16
of work, conditional cash transfers, and targeted (life-supporting) assistance 
where appropriate (Hunger Task Force, 2005).  
 
The international community is beginning to realize that a longer-term approach is 
needed to help people adapt to weather effects and strengthen their resilience to 
natural disasters. Developed countries have all introduced systems that transfer 
resources from the better off to the poorer, especially when the poor person 
involved is suffering from short-term deprivation or the effects of circumstances 
beyond the person’s control. In general, the transfers are in the form of cash, such 
as the well-recognized unemployment benefits paid to people without jobs around 
the world. Similar “social safety net” systems have not been used to any great 
extent in developing countries, partly because poor country governments are 
unable to mobilize the cash necessary and also because donors have been 
unwilling to fund cash payments. Instead, they have preferred to provide food aid, 
sometimes through “food for work” schemes and short-term responses to 
disasters. 
 
There have been a number of recent experiments in cash-based social safety nets, 
particularly in Latin America. Mexico’s Progresa programme provides cash to 
mothers to provide the basic services needed by their children. For example, cash 
payments depend upon the child attending school and seeking health services. 
Brazil’s programme to eliminate hunger provides $US20 per month to mothers for 
food, and at the same time supports agricultural production and establishes food 
reserves in the most food-insecure parts of Brazil. There has been much less 
success in introducing cash payment systems into the least developed countries, 
principally in Africa, but recently the idea of cash-based social safety nets has 
begun to take off. A major cash transfer programme has been launched in Kenya 
with the support of UNICEF and similar cash transfers programmes are being 
introduced elsewhere in Africa (Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Zambia, 
Zimbabwe). Cash relief grants to food-insecure are helping households (Ethiopia), 
child support grants are being distributed (Ethiopia, Namibia, South Africa), child 
care grants focusing on orphans and other vulnerable children have been 
introduced ( Lesotho, Malawi, South Africa, Tanzania), disability grants are being 
introduced (Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa), and non- contributory ‘social 
pensions’ (Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa) are replacing worker-funded 
schemes.  
 
The current trend in shifting social safety net support from short-term relief to 
longer-term social insurance is clear, but all of the schemes currently in operation 
are dealing with current levels of deprivation and may not be aligned with future 
needs caused by increasing vulnerability to the effects of climate change. What 
will be needed is improved access to insurance schemes that meet the needs of 
poor people while limiting the risk of the insurance provider, whether government 
or the private sector. When operating at its best food aid provides a solid 
foundation of insurance that protects people during poor years from selling off 
their assets and failing to invest in future production. The evidence for the success   17
of food aid as insurance is best demonstrated by the many examples of high crop 
yields following years of famine. The transition of poor economies to social 
security based on insurance has been very slow. A number of innovative schemes 
have begun to demonstrate value of commercial insurance to help poor people to 
deal with the variability of weather and other impacts on their livelihoods. An 
Indian non-governmental organization called BASIX has joined with ICICI Bank, 
India's largest private sector bank and Lombard, one of the oldest property and 
casualty insurance companies in Canada to provide insurance to small-scale 
farmers. BASIX and ICICI Lombard along with the Commodity Risk Management 
Group, World Bank, have piloted rainfall insurance in India since 2003. In 2005, 
insurance schemes have been rolled out in six Indian states. Among the insurance 
services offered is rainfall insurance, under which poor farmers are able to protect 
themselves against the effects of drought. The world Food Programme has taken 
the principle of weather insurance to a national level. AXA Re, a reinsurance 
company working with WFP, has underwritten $7 million of weather-related 
protection for small farmers in Ethiopia. 
 
The development community is moving from its old approaches based on welfare 
following crises to a more proactive approach based on an understanding of how to 
reduce the risks associated with exposure to natural hazards. These approaches 
will be increasingly needed as the effects of climate change affect more people as 
climate change exacerbates the effects that poor people are already experiencing 





A sound understanding of current capacities to adapt to weather variability can 
help mould policy for the future. Huq and Reid (2004) Provide a simple flow 
chart to indicate that the processes needed to adapt to future climate change 
will frequently be built on the adaptive processes already developed to cope 
with current weather variability (Figure 3). 
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Promoting pastoralim to adapt to climate change 
It is estimated that there are between 100 and 200 million mobile pastoralists 
in the world today (depending upon the definition of “mobility”). Some places 
will get wetter, and the options for the pastoralists there will be easiest to 
anticipate. Unfortunately, the IPCC predicts that many arid and semi arid parts 
of the developing world will get dryer, and the frequency of droughts will 
increase. The pastoralists there will be severely challenged, but if developing 
countries are to adapt their economies to the effects of climate change, the 
pastoralists must be part of the solution.  A number of policy decisions will be 
important. 
 
1.  Recognize the rights of pastoral groups in national policy, including the 
validity of their mobile lifestyles and their needs. 
 
2.  Protect the rights of pastoralists to land and water. 
 
3.  Provide pastoralists with social services, especially health and 
education, to begin preparing a generation of people ready to adapt to 
change. 
 
4.  Provide pastoral services, including road access to rangeland areas, 
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5.  recognise that pastoralism is not a meat production business – it is 
usually either a milk of fibre business, from which meat is a by-product 
(the relative importance of the commodities may shift according to 
market forces and policy incentives, which is part of the problem of an 
overt emphasis on meat markets) 
 
6.  Instigate animal health control that allows livestock to enter the 
international meat market. 
 
7.  Introduce financial services into pastoral areas. 
 
8.  Engage pastoralists in planning for a future affected by climate change. 
Recognize the need to provide education, training and social support to 
allow people to leave pastoralism and seek employment elsewhere. Plan 
for a pastoral future which is more intensive and employs fewer people 
to produce more and better animals.  Encourage pastoralists to enter the 
cash economy and begin to save money rather than depend on livestock. 
 
9.  Work with neighbouring countries to develop regional livestock 
industries, with reciprocal rights of movement across borders and 
combined markets. 
 
Adapt agricultural policy to build the resilience of smallholder farmers 
Smallholder farmers will be affected by climate change in many ways. Some 
farming areas may be favoured by increased overall levels of rain. However, 
farmers in such areas will still need considerable support and access to new 
technology and opportunities to benefit. Their crop varieties, ways of farming 
and animal breeds will all be poorly adapted to the new, wetter conditions. 
Other smallholder farmers will have to deal with a dryer climate. They could 
be pushed out of farming if conditions become too dry, but most places will 
remain viable for well-adapted agriculture.  The need for policy change is 
urgent, but most of the urgently-needed measures will have immediate 
benefits as well as long-term reduction of risk. 
 
1.  Strengthen (in many countries, restore) agricultural extension services 
and train them to understand farmers’ current adaptive skills and equip 
them to advise agricultural communities on future adaptation. 
 
2.  Support capacity development efforts for farmers’ associations and 
women’s groups. Encourage farmer-led adaptation and organize 
exchanges to permit farmers to learn from other’s adaptive knowledge. 
 
3.  Instigate a system of continually predicting expected future climatic 
conditions and analyse the likely most important local changes that will 
occur, and factor those changes into national policy on an on-going 
basis.   20
 
4.  Immediately invest in national agricultural research systems and task 
them to adapt crop varieties and animal breeds to current and future 
conditions. Establish seed multiplication and animal breeding facilities in 
advance of future need. These can be based on NGOs and community 
out-growing schemes. Place emphasis on high-value crops that can be 
adapted to the expected conditions (for example, oilseeds for dry 
areas). 
 
5.  Strengthen marketing systems, taking into account predicted climate 
changes, with an emphasis on providing continuing incentives for 
agricultural production as conditions change. 
 
6.  Review irrigation policy, recognizing that increasing production in the 
future will often require the increased use of irrigation, but that much 
large-scale irrigation could be threatened by climate change. Build 
technical capacities to advise on the development of small-scale 
intensive irrigation. 
 
7.  Immediately increase investment in education and social services for 
smallholder agricultural communities to prepare a future generation of 
education and healthy people who will be able to move out of farming 
and pursue other livelihoods. 
 
8.  Decentralize financial management and decision-making. Provide 
technical support for locally-led small-scale water management 
promotion. 
 
Design social safety nets to cater for forced changes 
However good a set of adaptation policies might be, it is inevitable that 
climate change will bring about considerable social disruption. Unless these 
changes are anticipated and adequate social safety nets put in place, the 
consequences in terms of social unrest, conflict over resources, displacement 
of people, strain on urban centres and international migration will be huge. 
Wherever possible, social support should support efforts to adapt and provide 
the means by which people can build on their current adaptive capacities to 
cope with greater change. In more extreme cases, social measures will be 
needed to help people move into totally different livelihoods. 
 
1.  Build financial systems that can be used by poor people. This might 
include small-scale credit schemes and financial services that reach to 
poor. 
 
2.  G r a d u a l l y  m o v e  f r o m  a  s y s t e m  t h a t  r e s p o n d s  t o  c r i s e s  t h r o u g h  
humanitarian relief to one that builds resilience. Encourage insurance 
schemes that help even out incomes and expenditures over years.   21
 
3.  Replace food aid, where possible, with systems of cash payment, 
especially systems that encourage household investment in health and 
education. 
 
4.  Reform land tenure systems to permit communities and individuals to 
transfer the use of, or sell, their land rights to facilitate movement of 
people and consolidation of land-holding in a fair, equitable and gender-
sensitive fashion. (This does not necessarily imply privatization, which 
would often threaten communally-held land, but should build on current 
land-holding norms). 
 
5.  Scale-up investment in job-creating development, including industrial 
development and adding value to agricultural goods. Review urban 
development, housing and social services policies to anticipate 
































Climate Change, Adaptation and Pastoralism
1 
 
Climate change will be felt differently depending on where you are and what you do, and 
opinions over what the future holds for the world’s pastoralists are polarised. Some experts 
believe that pastoralists will be the first to feel the effects of climate change, whilst others 
consider pastoralism to be an adaptation to climate change and therefore amongst the best 
equipped to deal with it. 
 
Pastoralism is a complex form of natural resource management, which requires maintaining 
an ecological balance between pastures, livestock and people, and it is an adaptive strategy 
to a stressful environment. This adaptation faces a myriad of challenges, of which climatic 
change is but one. Indeed, the challenge of climate change seems insignificant to many 
pastoralists who are faced with extreme political, social and economic marginalisation: relax 
these constraints and pastoral adaptive strategies might enable pastoralists to manage 
climate change better than many other rural inhabitants. The vulnerability that is associated 
with climate change in some pastoral environments has its roots in the restriction of tried and 
tested pastoral coping strategies, including the ability to move through different territories, 
to access critical livelihood resources, to trade across borders, to benefit from appropriate 
investments, and to participate in relevant policy decision-making. 
 
Current concern for climate change seems to start from the assumption that climate patterns 
normally do not change, yet in reality the climate has always been changing. More than once 
pastoralism has provided a means through which fairly sedentary populations could increase 
their mobility in order to survive in the face of deteriorating climatic conditions. However, 
although the phenomenon is not a new one, three main factors justify the current growing 
concern on this critical challenge: the rate and the scale of its occurrence and the magnitude 
of its social impact. 
 
A crucial adaptive response, whether to climate change, to global economic forces of to some 
other challenge, is to diversify livelihoods and embrace new opportunities. This adaptation is 
increasingly apparent in the blurring of the distinction between pastoralists and cultivators: a 

























numbers of crop farmers now have stock vested in pastoral systems. Despite the violent 
Despite the violent conflict that is associated with a small minority of the worlds pastoral 
regions, such collaborative and cooperative arrangements are the norm in pastoral areas. 
 
Pastoralism is changing and must innovate accordingly, and it needs support in policy, in 
markets and at a scientific level. The leap forward requires overcoming the 
traditional/modern, sedentary/mobile, public/private, local/central dichotomies which 
have so far contributed to patterns of un-sustainability.  
 
Paradoxically, although pastoralists have long been blamed for environmental degradation, 
they are amongst those most exposed to climate change phenomena, for which they are 
recognizably the least responsible. Nevertheless, where climatic conditions become more 
variable without leading to the collapse of rangelands, pastoral livelihoods have the 
potential to sustain populations in the face of climate change. Pastoralism may in fact 
provide food resources and secure a viable livelihood alternative where climate change and 
other pressures on ecosystems result in enhanced unreliability of marginal farming and the 
transformation of forest into savannah. 
 
In the debate over whether there is a difference between development and adaptation, it is 
worth recognising that the capacity to adapt is something intrinsically pastoral, and its loss 
has been associated with ‘development’. Sustainable pastoral development must be 
founded on the understanding that adaptive capacity is what makes pastoralism work and 
restoring, or enhancing, such capacities must be central to development plans. Adaptive 
capacity of pastoralists needs to be seen not as something different to, but as a primary 
indicator of, pastoral development. 
 
 
1 From “Change of Wind or Wind of Change? Climate change, adaptation and pastoralism” by Nori and Davies, The World Initiative 
for Sustainable Pastoralism, UNDP-GEF. 2007. 
 